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US Military Ammunition Policy: Reliving the Mistakes of the Past?
JIM COURTER, L. STEVE DAVIS, and LOREN B. THOMPSON
From Parameters, Autumn 1994, pp. 98-110

The current tensions in the Balkans, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Northeast Asia are a reminder that the
threat of regional warfare is never far away. The Bottom-Up Review of US military strategy and requirements
conducted by the Department of Defense in 1993 acknowledged this reality by making the ability to successfully wage
two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs) a key measure for shaping the US force structure.[1]
The possibility of having to prosecute two wars in rapid succession at widely separated locations also influences the
Pentagon's plans for consolidating the defense industrial base.
In the case of Northeast Asia, the prospect of conflict between North Korea's atavistic communist dictatorship and the
democratic Republic of Korea also should remind policymakers of a previous regional contingency, and of how poorly
conceived US military and industrial plans for that war proved to be. The Korean War that took place from June 1950
until mid-1953 resulted in 33,652 American battle deaths, and produced some very important lessons about how not to
prepare for military conflict. The purpose of this article is to focus on a single critical sector of the defense industrial
base--the ammunition industry--and to consider present plans for its consolidation in light of the lessons of the Korean
War.
The ammunition industry was selected because it is relatively small and unique, but also because its products are
essential to the military effectiveness of systems manufactured by much bigger sectors of the defense industrial base.
The Defense Department's total budget authority for conventional ammunition purchases in fiscal 1994 is $1.36
billion,[2] meaning that the industry will eventually realize revenues from this year's budget equivalent to about three
days of business by the General Motors Corporation.[3] Clearly, the ammunition industry is no behemoth. However,
without its output, weapons such as the M-1 tank that cost billions of dollars to develop and produce would be useless.
The Korean War is considered here because it was the last "major regional contingency" in which the United States
engaged that involved intense conventional warfare over a protracted period of time. Moreover, problems arose in the
production and distribution of ammunition during the Korean War that illuminate the deficiencies in current munitions
planning assumptions. Finally, there is a real danger that US forces may one day soon again find themselves at war on
the Korean Peninsula. It is worth remembering the mistakes made during the last Korean conflict in order to avoid
reliving them in a future one.
The Decline of the Ammunition Industry
The domestic ammunition industry consists of dozens of public and private facilities producing a vast array of end
items, including small arms ammunition, cannon and artillery shells, bombs, grenades, rockets, mines, dispenser
munitions, propellent charges, pyrotechnic devices, and explosives. The manufacture of most of these products is
supervised by the Army's Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command, which is responsible for meeting the
ammunition requirements of all the military services (except for a small portion of naval munitions). The command
manages 246 ammunition end-items from its headquarters at Rock Island, Illinois. Impressive as this number is, it is
less than half of the 590 end-items the Army's ammunition experts managed in the early 1990s, before drastic
consolidation efforts were begun in response to shrinking budgets.[4]
The pace of consolidation within the domestic ammunition base since 1992 has been so rapid that some observers have
referred to it as a collapse. While it is true that procurement accounts in general have declined much faster than other
categories of defense spending in recent years, few areas of procurement activity have been hit as hard as ammunition
purchases. Between 1985 and 1994, the inflation-adjusted buying power of the Pentagon's procurement budgets fell by
64 percent, compared with a more moderate 34-percent decline for overall defense spending. During the same period,

expenditures for ammunition declined 78 percent. As a result of this precipitous drop, 60 to 80 percent of all domestic
ammunition workers have lost their jobs. Industry executives project that one quarter of the remaining workers will be
laid off during 1994.[5] By 1995, the government-owned portion of the ammunition base is expected to have fewer
than 10,000 employees, compared to 26,000 in 1988.
A similar contraction has occurred in the number of plants producing military ammunition. The munitions industry
contains three types of production facilities: government-owned, government-operated (GOGO); government-owned,
contractor-operated (GOCO); and contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO). GOGO and GOCO facilities
generally produce propellants and explosives, and perform the final loading, assembly, and packaging of end-items.
COCO facilities usually produce nonexplosive components such as metal shells and fuzes. About 70 percent of
ammunition procurement budgets are spent on the latter activities.[6]
The number of both government-owned and contractor-owned facilities has shrunk considerably in recent years. In
1978 there were 286 privately owned plants involved in domestic ammunition production; that number fell to 88 in
January 1994, and it is expected to decline to 52 in 1995. The 32 government-owned ammunition plants operating in
1978 were pared to 24 by January 1994 and will fall to 19 in 1995--only nine of which will be active. Thus, in 1995
the total number of operating production facilities in the ammunition industrial base will have dropped from 318 to 71-a 78-percent reduction in less than 20 years.[7] Much of this contraction is due to necessary rationalization of an
aging production base, but there is no question that the rapid consolidation of facilities in recent years is primarily a
response to shrinking ammunition procurement budgets.
Despite the contraction in funding, facilities, and workforce, the ammunition industry retains a relatively large number
of producers. A study prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in October 1993 counted 45 prime
contractors and 132 key subcontractors still active in the business. This abundance of participants reflects the peculiar
structure of the industry, which consists of scores of unique end-items manufactured in small quantities on dedicated
production equipment for a wide range of applications. Because output is so diverse and production lots are so limited
in size, there is seldom more than one source for any given item. Further consolidation of the industry will be
necessary to bring the number of producers into alignment with anticipated demand, but this process may well
exacerbate the vulnerabilities inherent in having only one source--and in most cases only one production facility--for
specific munitions.
Emerging Vulnerabilities in Ammunition
The expected contraction of the ammunition production base in response to shrinking procurement budgets has had
some beneficial consequences. At the end of the Cold War, the munitions industry was burdened with a huge amount
of excess capacity that clearly needed to be eliminated. Cutting the ammunition budget is one way to force government
managers to think coherently about which production capabilities are essential and which are superfluous. Reduced
demand also encourages marginal producers to abandon the business, so that only the most efficient suppliers remain.
The US Army went through just such a rationalization exercise in 1992. An internal study of the ammunition base
concluded that it was "in critical condition and getting worse."[8] The study questioned whether, in its debilitated state,
the base could meet the requirement to sustain US forces in two major regional contingencies. The Army subsequently
decreased the number of end-items it was managing from 590 to 246, a 58-percent reduction designed to concentrate
production efforts on those ammunition types truly relevant to future war requirements. A total of 198 production lines
were declared excess, and 32,000 pieces of government-owned equipment were removed from the production base.
New purchases of ammunition were restricted to established producers to encourage retention of a reasonably stable
and competent supplier community.[9] The rationalized ammunition base is much smaller, but also more sustainable
given projected levels of demand for the remainder of the decade.
Unfortunately, ammunition budgets continued to decline after 1992 and are now so small that it is not certain an
adequate base can be maintained for even the most essential munitions. As funding has diminished, Defense
Department policies arguably have become less and less realistic about the requirements that the ammunition base
might need to meet. The department no longer envisions the need to mobilize or surge ammunition production in
response to a national emergency; instead it proposes to draw upon existing stockpiles of ammunition in the event of

war, and then gradually replenish supplies once peace is restored. This approach will not work for at least two reasons:
portions of the existing stockpile are poorly suited for fighting wars, and the production base is rapidly losing its
capacity to replenish wartime consumption while keeping pace with peacetime needs.
The Elusive Stockpile. During the Cold War the US Army accumulated a huge stockpile of ammunition that is
currently estimated to contain two million tons of usable items. Present policy calls for the services to draw upon these
supplies to prosecute the two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies described in the Bottom-Up Review.
However, a careful analysis of the stockpile's contents reveals that most of these munitions could not reliably sustain
US forces in wartime:[10]
The largest category of stockpiled ammunition--nearly 30 percent of the total--is war reserve stocks for allies
(WRSA) stored in Korea, Western Europe, and elsewhere. These munitions are set aside for use by allied forces
in wartime and therefore probably would not be available to US forces; some of the WRSA munitions are no
longer used in currently fielded US weapon systems.
A second sizable component of the Army stockpile (about 25 percent of the total) is "applicable training"
ammunition, meaning munitions that either were specifically designed for training or that have been in storage
for so long that they are considered suitable only for training. Some of these munitions could be used to fight a
war, but their reliability is so doubtful that they potentially could place US forces at risk.
A third portion of the stockpile (also 25 percent) consists of so-called "discretionary" munitions which, while
usable in wartime, are not as capable as the most modern ammunition types. Discretionary ammunition--also
known as "substitute" ammunition--has less range and lethality than current-generation munitions, so it may
require users to take greater risks in wartime; in addition, the reliability of discretionary rounds will become
increasingly doubtful in the late 1990s due to their age.
About 15 percent of the Army stockpile is made up of the most modern and capable munitions, which are known
as "applicable go-to-war" munitions. These are the munitions that commanders would prefer to use in all combat
engagements, because of their high performance and reliability.
The smallest category of stockpiled ammunition is "excess" supplies designated for demilitarization or transfer to
friendly countries. None of the munitions in this category would be used in wartime by US forces.
Thus, it appears that only 40 percent of the Army's ammunition stockpile has any real relevance to war-fighting, and
most of the munitions included in that smaller total are discretionary types that commanders would prefer not to use.
But it is precisely that discretionary category of ammunition that constitutes the Defense Department's real reserve for
fighting two nearly simultaneous contingencies. The 323,000 tons of munitions in the "applicable go-to-war" category
represent less than the amount of ammunition sent to the Persian Gulf region in 1990-91 to prosecute Operation Desert
Storm. Obviously, if a second Desert Storm-scale contingency occurred at the same time that US forces were at war
elsewhere in the world, the Army would have no choice but to draw upon discretionary stocks.[11]
That would not be a pleasant experience. In armored warfare, for example, it would require US forces to approach
closer to enemy tanks before firing (due to the lesser range of discretionary ammunition), possibly putting US tanks
within range of the enemy's guns. Many of the specific munitions types in the discretionary category lack the
precision, penetration, and explosive power of advanced munitions, so the performance of US forces would almost
certainly be degraded. What effect the awareness of these ammunition deficiencies might have on commanders'
willingness to take risks is impossible to gauge, but the effect could hardly be positive.
It also should be kept in mind that each major category of munitions in the stockpile in turn consists of many
subcategories and ammunition types. For some types of ammunition, the current stockpile is not adequate to support
one major regional contingency, much less two. According to knowledgeable observers, the ammunition stockpiles of
the other military services exhibit deficiencies similar to those of the Army.
The Eroding Production Base. Even if stockpiled munitions were fully sufficient to sustain two major regional
contingencies--which they aren't--the ammunition industry still would be required to replenish munitions within a
reasonable period of time after the cessation of hostilities. It can't. In 1992 the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) assessed the capacity of 35 industrial sectors to support recovery from a conflict. It rated the
ammunition sector dead last in its ability to replace critical war supplies in an acceptable time frame and at an

acceptable cost. Military ammunition budgets have declined steadily since FEMA conducted its assessment; since the
productive capacity of the industry generally corresponds to budget levels (with a two-year time-lag from
appropriations), it can be assumed that the production base has eroded further in the intervening years.[12]
The rapid deterioration of the ammunition industrial base is reflected in a series of industry-funded studies prepared by
the Science Applications International Corporation. One study tracked the increasing delays involved in filling
requisitions for various types of essential ammunition by comparing the experience of Desert Storm in 1990-91 with
the Army's ammunition base ratings in 1992 and the anticipated effect of the fiscal 1994 ammunition procurement
budget. It found that whereas during Desert Storm requisitions in all categories of ammunition could be filled within a
year, the effect of the 1994 budget would be to lengthen delivery times to more than a year for most ammunition
types.[13]
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Figure 1. Lead-times to Fill Ammunition Requirements.
A second study prepared by Science Applications International Corporation projected that the productive capacity of
the ammunition industrial base would drop to $3.6 billion in 1994 dollars by the turn of the century, less than a third of
its $11 billion capacity in the mid-1980s. It calculated that even if capacity normally used to meet civilian ammunition
needs is included, total capacity will be considerably less than required to meet the consumption and replenishment
demand generated by two major regional contingencies. In fact, shortages in certain categories of ammunition are
likely if only one regional contingency occurs.[14]
All such projections are based upon problematical assumptions and are scenario-dependent. Nonetheless, pessimism
about the capacity of the ammunition industrial base to meet future requirements is clearly warranted:
Ammunition procurement budgets are not likely to rise above the current, very low amounts for the rest of the
1990s; the productive capacity of the ammunition industrial base therefore probably will stabilize at levels where
there is little excess that can be applied to unanticipated needs.
Most of the munitions that are essential to warfighting are unique to the military. The skills and equipment
needed to produce them do not exist in readily transferable form in the commercial marketplace.
The majority of military ammunition types are now manufactured by single sources at single sites; catastrophic
accidents, explosions, or sabotage therefore could completely shut down the production of essential munitions
for a significant period of time.
Modern munitions are more complex than those used in the past; the demanding specifications, wide range of
skills, advanced equipment, and extensive array of materials needed to manufacture them all increase the
potential for delays in initiating or accelerating production.
Laws regulating the handling of hazardous materials have proliferated in recent years; compliance with these
laws would almost certainly slow efforts to increase ammunition production.
With all of these factors at work, it is possible to imagine circumstances in which the conduct of a future war could be
disrupted by ammunition shortages. However, there is no need to be imaginative, because just such a problem nearly
occurred during the Korean War. The Korean experience offers useful insights into the current dilemmas of
ammunition planning and policy.
The Lessons of Korea

When North Korea invaded the South on 24 June 1950, it presented the United States with its first major regional
military contingency of the postwar period. Although US military forces were poorly prepared to wage conventional
warfare in Korea, President Truman decided not to use the atomic bomb, preferring instead to respond in a manner
proportional to the scale of communist aggression. Fortunately, the unfolding conflict seemed to provide US and South
Korean defenders with several advantages. North Korea's weapons generally were no match for those of the United
States, and the configuration of the Korean peninsula made it readily accessible to US naval and air forces. Moreover,
Korea was only a hundred miles from Japan, where General Douglas MacArthur commanded the largest concentration
of US forces outside the continental United States, including four Army divisions.[15]
One issue that received relatively little attention initially was whether ammunition supplies would be adequate to
prosecute the war. The United States had produced 20 million tons of ammunition during World War II, and a sizable
portion of that output remained in military stockpiles in 1950. For example, the week that hostilities broke out in
Korea, the US Army had on hand over six million rounds of its standard 155mm howitzer ammunition. In addition, it
had retained an infrastructure for producing ammunition valued at over $2 billion, including 14 loading plants, 12
powder and explosive works, and three shell factories. When combined with relevant private-sector facilities, this
substantial production base seemed capable of meeting any demand generated by the Korean conflict once stocks were
depleted.[16]
The stocks for many tactical rounds were so extensive that there was doubt about the need to gear up for production at
all. In October 1950, when military planners were preparing a supplemental appropriation request to pay for the war
effort, stockpile managers estimated that they had a four-year supply of 155mm rounds on hand and a three-year
supply of 105mm rounds, based on past experience with wartime consumption rates. Since few planners expected the
war to last that long, a paltry $374 million was requested for ammunition--primarily to begin the process of mobilizing
the production base.[17]
However, optimism about munitions reserves soon faded, and within a few months there was growing concern that
units in Korea might face crippling shortages. The turning point came in November 1950, when Communist China
entered the war. This widened the scope and intensity of the conflict, leading to a surge in demand for most
ammunition types. Consumption of ammunition over the next two years far exceeded the rate planners had expected as
outnumbered US and South Korean forces relied heavily on firepower to compensate for their numerical inferiority.
For instance, during the battle of Soyang in mid-May 1951, 21 artillery battalions supporting the X Corps fired
309,958 rounds in seven days, well over a thousand tons of ammunition per day. In late August and early September
of the same year, fighting near Inje resulted in the use of more than a million rounds of 105mm and 155mm
ammunition in only 15 days.[18]
Even the vast stockpiles of ammunition left over from World War II would not sustain these consumption rates for
very long. New production would be needed, and quickly. Unfortunately, the ammunition production base was in no
condition to manufacture large quantities of munitions anytime soon. Although the government-owned portion of the
base was worth more than $2 billion, only one percent of that amount had been spent on maintaining it each year, and
most plants were manned by skeleton crews that would need to be supplemented by newly trained workers.
Appropriations for ammunition production during 1946-1950 had averaged less than $30 million per year, hardly
enough to maintain a warm industrial base. Production during 1949 and 1950 had been limited almost entirely to small
quantities for new weapons, munitions that obviously were not available in the World War II reserves.[19]
When the danger of ammunition shortfalls became apparent, appropriations for new production were greatly increased.
Total ammunition procurement funding in fiscal 1951 rose to $2.1 billion, far above the $36 million of the preceding
year. A further $1.1 billion was appropriated in 1952, and $1.9 billion in 1953. But it took time for these large
appropriations to translate into actual output. Not only was the production base cold but the civilian workforce was
fully engaged in other pursuits. A major steel strike and lack of capacity in the machine tool industry combined with
the government's lethargic contracting procedures to delay production by many months.[20]
Colonel John B. Medaris of the Army's ordnance division shed some light on the cause of the delays in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 10 March 1953. Medaris explained that "in the establishment of new
producers of major components we may properly anticipate that the time from appropriation to first production may be

as much as eighteen months." This was bad enough, but Medaris went on to note that "contracts for the production of
some such items may be placed, in some cases, almost a year after the appropriation became available." Medaris
concluded that it could take "as much as two and a half years, or sometimes more, after the appropriation" before
actual production occurred. This meant some munitions that Congress appropriated money for only weeks after North
Korea invaded the South in the summer of 1950 might not find their way to front-line units until early 1953.[21]
Luckily, that was a worst-case scenario. New production of most ammunition types took less time, and shortages of
munitions at the front were due more to imbalances in consumption and distribution than to a shortage of operational
reserves. The few supply-driven shortfalls that did arise were confined primarily to new ammunition types, rather than
the standard tactical rounds in the reserves.[22] Thus it appears that there was no time during the conflict when the war
effort was significantly impeded by shortages in the supply of ammunition. But it could have been:
If the pace of hostilities witnessed in 1951 had continued into 1952 and 1953, ammunition shortages almost
certainly would have resulted.
If the military services had not inherited such a large reserve of ammunition from World War II, production
delays would have caused shortages at the front.
If the war had occurred in the mid-1950s rather than the early 1950s, the stockpile would have been less reliable,
the production base more debilitated, and the availability of necessary skills doubtful.
If a second major regional contingency had occurred at the same time Korea was being fought, or shortly
thereafter, the military services probably would have lacked the ammunition needed to fight it effectively.
The latter point is particularly important in light of current ammunition policies. Many of the assumptions guiding
ammunition procurement during the early stages of the Korean conflict proved to be wrong. What if these errors had
been compounded by the outbreak of a second conflict elsewhere in the world? Secretary of the Army Frank Pace
offered this opinion in an appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 7 May 1952: "If we are called
upon to help counter one or more other limited communist aggressions elsewhere in the world while we are still
engaged in Korea, or even shortly after the war there might end, we will not be able to bring immediate and effective
military pressure to bear."[23] Awareness of this danger undoubtedly influenced US policymakers' perceptions of their
options during the early years of the Eisenhower Administration. It may have made them less likely to engage in
military activities--or more likely to use the atomic bomb.
It is not hard to see the implications of the Korea experience for modern ammunition planners. Clausewitz's concept of
friction has as much relevance for logisticians and procurement managers as it does for operational military
commanders. Wars seldom occur when and where they are expected. They seldom unfold as anticipated. They
frequently make demands on the industrial base that are not reflected in war plans, and efforts to satisfy those demands
are often disrupted by unforeseen budgetary, regulatory, technological, and managerial problems. Because so many
things can go wrong, and usually do, it is essential that policymakers not engage in wishful thinking about what war
will require. The more optimistic plans are, the more likely they are to go awry. Regrettably, the Defense Department's
plans for providing US military forces with ammunition in two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies are
beginning to look very optimistic indeed.
Conclusion: Avoiding the Mistakes of the Past
The Defense Department's present approach to ammunition planning and procurement is short-sighted and risks
disaster in a future conflict. The existing ammunition stockpile is not adequate to sustain US forces in two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts, and the industrial base is being allowed to deteriorate to a point where it cannot
cover shortages in a timely manner. Unanticipated problems that arose in the consumption and production of
ammunition during the Korean War demonstrate the danger of relying too heavily on ammunition reserves or
overestimating the responsiveness of the industrial base. To paraphrase philosopher George Santayana, these are
mistakes that current US policymakers must either recognize or be doomed to repeat.
The main reason that the ammunition industrial base has been allowed to deteriorate is to save money. Although many
policymakers realize that ammunition accounts are not being adequately funded, they have accepted the current state of
affairs because they have more pressing budgetary priorities and the threat to US national security is greatly

diminished. However, the lesson of the Korean conflict is that threats can arise rapidly and unexpectedly, while the
consequences of bad policies can take years to reverse. It therefore makes little sense to starve ammunition accounts in
order to fund other activities; these accounts consume a very small share of total defense spending and yet they are
essential to the wartime effectiveness of many of the nation's most costly weapon systems.
In order to prevent further erosion of US ammunition capabilities, three basic steps must be taken. First of all, more
money must be spent on procuring modern munitions. Fiscal 1994 funding for all ammunition types for all three
military services stands at about one-half of one percent of the defense budget. This amount is not enough to meet
peacetime training requirements, much less bolster war reserves.[24] Depressed budget levels will inevitably lead to
diminished surge and replenishment capability. Massive increases in ammunition spending are not necessary; but when
expenditures for all ammunition procurement fall far below one percent of the defense budget, it is a likely sign that
munitions are not receiving the level of resources that they require.
A second step that must be taken is for federal regulatory agencies to permit greater flexibility in the consolidation of
the ammunition base. The ammunition sector currently contains too many producers to be supported by projected
levels of demand, and further rationalization of excess capacity is therefore necessary. The Defense Science Board
recently completed a review of antitrust policy that led it to recommend changes in the way the Defense Department
interacts with the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission in considering corporate mergers and
acquisitions.[25] If implemented, these changes should alleviate the problems that some ammunition producers have
faced in trying to form more robust business combinations.
A final, truly essential step is for defense decisionmakers to be more realistic about the requirements that future
conflicts might impose on the industrial base. The national military strategy and defense planning guidance must
provide a sensible industrial base requirement for ammunition. The present approach of relying on reserves in wartime
and replenishing after hostilities have ceased is typical of the flawed policymaking that occurs when threats are
diminished and decisionmakers are not thinking clearly about future challenges to national security. New threats
eventually will arise, and when they do the policy of not even trying to maintain an ammunition surge capability will
have to be changed. It would make more sense to preserve an adequate ammunition base today, rather than having to
undertake a costly reconstitution effort in the future.
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